rtt-ri ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS
a0748
11:24 12-07

^BC-ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS SKED@
^THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@

REMARKS OF DEFENSE SECRETARY LES ASPIN
TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

WASHINGTON, DC

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1993

.STX

TRANSCRIPT BY: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE
620 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20045

SEC. ASPIN: (Applause.) Thank you, Dr. Elberts (sp) very much for that nice introduction. And let me just say what a pleasure it is to be here. I see an awful lot of friends in the audience and I appreciate you coming over here this morning to be part of this presentation.

I really am particularly pleased to be able to talk about this important topic in front of this kind of an audience because I know that very many of you have given a lot of thought to this issue over the years, the issue of nuclear weapons in general and the issue of non-proliferation and proliferation problems in particular. And, therefore, I thought this was a very, very appropriate audience to try and talk to about this subject and really to begin a dialogue with all of you about this topic. And we are very anxious to hear your views and your ideas about what we ought to do and your thoughts about what we're proposing to do. This is something that is going to take

all of our best efforts.

The national security requirements of the United States have, quite obviously, and everybody understands, undergone very fundamental
.ETX

.STX

change in the last few years. We won the Cold War. The Soviet threat that dominated our strategy, doctrine, weapons acquisition, everything that we did, is now gone, and so has gone the threat of nuclear global war. But disagreements did not end with that victory, and neither did threats to the United States, its people or its interests.

Now, as part of the bottom-up review which we undertook earlier this year, which was to go back and fundamentally review the need for defense and what kind of a defense that we should have in this post- Cold War, post-Soviet world, as part of that review, we began to think about what are the threats to the United States now that the Soviet Union has disintegrated and the Warsaw Pact is no more, what are the threats that we're buying a defense establishment for? And what we came up with was essentially four chief threats that we thought were something that the Defense Department ought to be concerned about.

The first of these is a new danger posed by the increased threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction -- chemical and biological weapons. The second threat is regional dangers posed by the threat of aggression by powers such as Saddam Hussein -- and Saddam Hussein is Exhibit A; there are other possibilities. The third danger is the danger that democratic and market reforms that are underway in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the danger that they will fail. That would be a third danger for us in the post-Cold War, post-Soviet era. And finally, there is an economic danger. In the short run, the national security of the United States is protected by a strong military; in the long run, the national security is protected by a strong economy. So a strong economy -- or the danger of a weaker economy is danger number four.

MORE

.ETX

LLLEnglish

rtt-ri ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS
a0757
11:27 12-07

^BC-ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS 1STADD@
^THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@
ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 3 12/07/93
.STX

x x x four.

So, those are four new dangers. Of the four of them, the one that most urgently and directly threatens Americans at home and American interests abroad is the new nuclear danger. The new nuclear danger is a more immediate physical threat to America directly. And it's a new danger. The old nuclear danger we faced was thousands of warheads in the hands of the Soviet Union. The new nuclear danger we face is perhaps as little as a handful of nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states or even terrorist organizations. And the engine of this new nuclear danger is, of course, proliferation.

We ought to recall, very briefly, how we dealt with the old nuclear danger -- the nuclear danger in the Cold War era. Dealing with that had three approaches. One was deterrence. Second was arms control. And third was a non-proliferation policy based on prevention. And, by and large, the three of them worked.

But that was then and this is now. We now face the potential of a greatly increase proliferation problem. This increase is the product of two changes that have been going on in the world today. The first arises from the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The second arises from the nature of technology diffusion in this new world.

Let's talk about each of them just briefly, one at a time. First, the former Soviet Union. The continued existence of the former Soviet Union's arsenal, amidst revolutionary changes, gives rise to several potential proliferation problems. In other words, we've got a super-power -- a nuclear super-power -- which is undergoing fundamental changes.

The fallout of that is proliferation dangers -- and they come in several forms. First and most obvious is that nuclear weapons are now deployed on the territory of four states, whereas before there was one. The safe and secure transport and dismantlement of these weapons is one of the U.S. government's highest priorities.

Second that comes from what's going on in the Soviet Union is the potential for what has come to be called ''loose nukes.'' In a time of profound transition in the former Soviet Union, it is possible that nuclear weapons or the materials that go into

making nuclear weapons could find their way into some kind of a nuclear black market. So, that's danger number two.

Third, nuclear and other weapons expertise for hire could go to would be proliferators. The brain-drain -- the possibility that

.ETX

ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 4 12/07/93
.STX

people working on the nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union are now available for hire in other parts of the world.

Fourth, whatever restraint the former Soviet Union exercised over its client states with nuclear ambitions -- such as North Korea -- is much diminished. Regional power balances have been disrupted and all ethnic conflicts have re-emerged.

So, those are the kind of dangers that are coming from one of the changes that is going on in the world today, which is the changes going on in the Soviet Union, which is a nuclear super-power in the throes of some fundamental changes. And there are some proliferation dangers that come from that.

But more important -- more important is the other new development that exacerbates today's proliferation problem -- and that is a by- product of growth in world trade and the rising tide of technology everywhere.

MORE

.ETX

LLLEnglish

rtt-ri ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS
a0758
11:28 12-07

^BC-ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS 2NDADD@
^THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@
ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 5 12/07/93
.STX

x x x everywhere.

The world economy today is characterized by an ever-increasing volume of trade leading to ever greater diffusion of technology. Simply put, this will make it harder and harder to detect illicit diversions of materials and technology useful for weapons development.

Moreover, many potential aggressors no longer have to import the sophisticated technology they need. They are growing it at home. The growth of indigenous technology can completely change the nonproliferation equation. Potential proliferators are sometimes said to be, quote, ''several decades behind the West,'' end quote. That's not much comfort nowadays. A would-be nuclear nation is, for example, four decades behind the West. Then in 1993 it is at the same technology level as the United States was in 1953.

By 1953, the United States had fission weapons. We were building intercontinental-range bombers, and we were developing intercontinental missiles. Realize, too, that most of the thermonuclear weapons in the United States' arsenal were designed in the 1960s using computers which were then known as supercomputers. However, these same supercomputers are no more powerful than today's laptop personal computers that you can pick up at the store or order through the catalog.

These new developments tell us a couple of very important things. The first, of course, is that we face a bigger proliferation danger than we've ever faced before. But second and more important, and that's the message of this lecture here this morning, is that the policy of prevention through denial won't be enough to cope with the potential of tomorrow's proliferators.

The bottom line is that all of the things that we have been doing in the past are important to continue, as we will discuss here in the speech, but the point is that, by themselves, they're not enough. The rising tide of technology has made denial of technology an insufficient guarantee of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

In concrete terms, here's where we stand today: There are more than 20 countries, many of them hostile to the United States, its friends or allies, that are now or are -- that have

now or are developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and, of course, the means to deliver them.

MORE

.ETX

ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 6 12/07/93
.STX

.ETX

LLLEnglish

rtt-ri ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS
a0771
11:37 12-07

^BC-ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS 3RDADD@
^THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@
ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 7 12/07/93
.STX

x x x them.

There are more than 12 countries which have operational ballistic missiles, and others have programs to develop operational ballistic missiles. Weapons of mass destruction may directly threaten our forces in the field and, in a more subtle way, threaten the effective use of those forces. This is an important point because in some ways, in fact, the role of nuclear weapons in the United States scheme of thing has completely changed. We've undergone a fundamental change in our interest in nuclear weapons.

During the Cold War -- let me explain how that works. During the Cold War, our principal adversary had conventional forces in Europe that were numerically superior to the West. For us during those years nuclear weapons were the great equalizer. They equalized our military force vis-a-vis a conventionally superior Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The threat to use nuclear weapons was present and was used to compensate for the smaller numbers of conventional forces. Now today, in today's (title ?), nuclear weapons can still be the equalizer against conventional forces, the standard role for nuclear weapons to play, the equalizer, but today, the United States in the West is the biggest kid on the block when it comes to conventional military forces, and it is our potential adversaries who may attain nuclear weapons. So nuclear weapons may still be the great equalizer; the problem is the United States may now be the equalizee.

So it's not just -- and all of this, of course, does not just apply to nuclear weapons. All the potential threat nations are at least as capable of producing biological and chemical agents. They might not have usable weapons yet and they might not use them if they do, but clearly our commanders in the field have to assume that U.S. forces are threatened by this whole range of weapons of mass destruction. So the threat is real, and the threat is upon us today, not in the future; it's here and now.

President Clinton directed the world's attention to it in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly last September. He said, quote, ''One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear, chemical or biological, and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on

populations hundreds of miles away. If we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure.'' End quote.

So, to respond to the president, we have created at the Department of Defense the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, and

.ETX

ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 8 12/07/93
.STX

with this initiative, we are making some essential change demanded by this increased threat. We are adding the task of protection to the task of prevention.

MORE

.ETX

LLLEnglish

rtt-ri ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS
a0780
11:41 12-07

^BC-ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS 4THADD@
^THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@
ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 9 12/07/93
.STX

x x x prevention.

In the past, the emphasis was always on prevention, the nonproliferation -- the prevention. The policy of nonproliferation combines global diplomacy and regional security efforts with the denial of material and know-how to would-be proliferators. Now, that is prevention, and that still remains our preeminent goal.

In North Korea, for example, a topic much in the news nowadays, our goal is still prevention. Our -- and we're still looking for a non-nuclear peninsula and a strong nonproliferation regime.

The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in no ways means we will lessen our nonproliferation efforts. In fact, in some ways, as we'll talk about in a little while, what we're doing in the counterproliferation area actually strengthens the nonproliferation role. But what the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative recognizes is that, in spite of all the efforts, proliferation may still occur. Thus, we are adding an element of protection as a major policy goal.

There's a chart up here that shows this, and I guess you all have copies of it. But what it does is it shows how the two, the prevention and the protection, combine to make a complete attack on the problem. On the left-hand side of the column there, we have the policy instruments for prevention. On the right are the steps that we take to protect if proliferation occurs in spite of our best efforts. What's new is the emphasis on the right-hand side of the chart, where the Defense Department has a very special responsibility of all the departments of the United States government.

At the heart of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, therefore, is a drive to develop new military capabilities to deal with this new threat. It has five elements to deal with the defusing, deterrence, offense, defense part of the protection. We have five elements to that.

One is the creation of a new mission by the president -- this new mission, this counterproliferation mission.

Number two, we have to change what we buy to meet the threat.

Number three, we have to plan to fight wars differently.

Number four, we have to change how we collect intelligence and what intelligence we collect.

.ETX

ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 10 12/07/93
.STX

And, number five, we have to do all of these things with our allies.

Let me look just briefly at each of them in turn.

The first point -- the new mission. President Clinton not only recognized the danger of the new threat; he gave us this new mission to cope with it. We have issued defense planning -- ''we'' meaning DOD here -- have issued defense planning guidance to the services to make sure that everyone understands what the president wants and what the word is here. In the organization of the Office of Secretary of Defense, we've added a new position of assistant secretary of defense for nuclear security and counterproliferation being held by Ash Carter.

The second point -- what we buy. We in the Defense Department are reviewing all relevant programs to see what we can do better and to make it apply to this new counterproliferation.

MORE

.ETX

LLLEnglish

rtt-ri ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS
a0819
12:00 12-07

^BC-ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS 5THADD@
^THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@
ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 11 12/07/93
.STX

x x x counterproliferation.

Go over all the programs. See if there's something that we can change or something we could buy or something we wouldn't buy in the light of this new counterproliferation protection mission that we have.

For example, we're looking at improving non-nuclear penetrating munitions to deal with underground installations. We're working hard on better ways to hunt mobile missiles, after our difficulties in finding SCUDs during the Gulf War. And, of course, and the most important from a financial standpoint in change, we have re-oriented the strategic defense inititative into the ballistic missile defense organization. And we'll focus the program to concentrate on responding to theater missile threats that are the ones that are here today.

We've also -- as part of this -- proposed a clarification in the ABM treaty, would allow us to develop and test a theater missile defense system -- THAD -- to meet a real threat without undermining an important agreement. This is an essential element of our counterproliferation strategy. So, point number two is the acquisition part has to be re-adjusted in the light of the new emphasis here.

Third point is, we have to adjust how we fight wars. We are developing guidance for dealing with this new threat -- fighting a DESERT STORM kind of war with the opponent actually having a handful of nuclear weapons. We have directed the services to tell us how prepared they are for it. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our regional commanders -- the CINCs -- are developing a military planning process for dealing with adversaries who have weapons of mass destruction.

And our concerns are by no means limited to the nuclear threat. We have a new joint office to oversee all DOD biological defense programs. This is the first time the department has organized its collective expertise to deal with the tough biological defense problems that we face. So, third is the -- is re-organizing ourselves to fight these new kind of wars -- DESERT STORMs with an opponent that has more in the way of weapons of mass destruction.

The fourth point is intelligence. After the war with Iraq, we discovered that Saddam Hussein had a much more extensive

nuclear weapons program underway than we knew at the time. Moreover, we learned during the war that we had failed to destroy his biological -- we learned, later, that during the war, we had failed to destroy his biological and chemical war efforts.
.ETX

ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 12 12/07/93
.STX

We don't want to be caught like that again. So, we're working to improve our counterproliferation intelligence. As the first step, we're pursuing an arrangement with the Director of Central Intelligence to establish a new deputy director for military support in the intelligence community's non-proliferation center. And we're tripling the number of Defense Department experts assigned to that center. We're looking for intelligence that is useful militarily, not just intelligence that's useful diplomatically.

Final point, fifth point, is international cooperation. Our allies and security partners around the world have as much to be concerned about in this area as we do. We have cabled an initiative with NATO to increase alliance efforts against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction -- an initiative that we think is going to become part of the NATO Summit that's coming up in January.

We're also cooperating actively with the Japanese government on deployment of a theater missile there, and possibly on some kind of a way of developing such systems jointly. We're paying special attention to the dangerous potential problems of weapons and nuclear proliferations -- nuclear material proliferating from the Soviet Union. We're even including Russia in our attempt to re-shape export controls on sensitive technology -- the control system used to be aimed at the eastern European Bloc. We are now incorporating former Eastern Bloc countries in our efforts to impede would be proliferators.

The Defense Department can play a very constructive role -- as all of you know -- in balancing economics and security here. And in this effort, we have been guided by and inspired by and depend heavily on the excellent work conducted by the National Academy of Sciences.

So, to sum up, we've undertaken a new mission at the Department of Defense. For many years, we planned to counter the weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Now, we've recognized a new problem and we're acting to meet it with counterproliferation.

At the same time, that counterproliferation initiative compliments non-proliferation in three important ways. It promotes consensus on the gravity of the threat, helping to

maintain the international non-proliferation effort. That's one way in which talking about counterproliferation will strengthen non-proliferation.

Second, it reduces the military utility of weapons of mass destruction while non-proliferation keeps up the price, making them less attractive to the proliferators.

MORE

.ETX

LLLEnglish

rtt-ri ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS
a0823
12:02 12-07

^BC-ASPIN-NATL-ACDMY-SCNS 6THADD@
^THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@
ASPIN/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PAGE 13 12/07/93
.STX

x x x proliferators.

And a third way in which the counterproliferation strengthens non- proliferation is that it reduces the vulnerability of the neighbors of those holding these weapons, further reducing the motive to acquire them in the first place.

So here we are in a new era. We have released our bottom-up review that provided a blueprint for our conventional forces for the years ahead. Our Defense Counterproliferation Initiative will allow us to deal with the number one threat that's identified in the bottom- up review, and it will help provide the real strength America needs to meet the dangers we face. The public expects nothing less from its Department of Defense than the right responses to the new world.

Thank you all very much for coming and being with me today. Thank you.

(Applause.)

####

END

.ETX

LLLEnglish